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You can persuade yourself in various ways that the Aquinian Seven are a pretty good philosophical psychology. For example, you can examine each in turn, noting its importance in human flourishing (McCloskey 2006) . Plato did, finding the four in balance in the good person or the good polis. "His own distinctive contribution," writes the classicist Helen North, "is the theory that all virtue depends on the orderly arrangement of faculties within the soul, a condition achieved by the practice of sōphrosynē," that is, temperance, just as in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Prudence is the executive function, and especially when pursued alone can be thought of as self interest or rationality in attaining ends. Justice is the social balance answering to the personal balance of temperance. Thus Plato and the stoic tradition.
Courage is the characteristically male interest, and no wonder therefore that the pagan four elevated it high. The Christians elevated love to primacy, and is therefore construed as feminine. The other Christian additions, hope and faith, are at first puzzling, but less so when hope is understood in secular terms as the forward-looking virtue of imagination, hope, and as the backward-looking virtue of imagination, faith. In other words, hope is the virtue of having a human project. Faith is the virtue of having a human identity. They do not have to be theological. But they do constitute, along with the higher form of love (what the Greeks called agape) the "transcendent.'
Or you can imagine the miseries of a human life without one of the seven, a life without courage, cowering in the corner; or a life without faith, without identity; or a life without hope, left abruptly this afternoon with a bullet to your head.
Or you can ask people how they feel about the virtues. Alan Wolfe found in his surveys and interviews about American ethical views in the 1990s that "virtue," 9 9 singular, means little to ordinary Americans, except to arouse irritation at the conservative churches and their recent obsession with sex, sex, sex. But to Wolfe's Americans the particular named virtues, plural, mean a great deal, provoking calm yet committed discussion. Americans admire, for example, loyalty, that blend of the theological and pagan virtues. And especially they admire honesty-justice and temperance with a dash of courage and a teaspoon of faith. In a broader sense "honesty" is used to mean a bourgeois blend of all the virtues (Wolfe 2002, p. 23ff) .
Or you can note that the seven virtues figure in the stories of our culture. The historian of rhetoric Robert Hariman argues that in answering the question what is to be done you can stand with some of the philosophers such as Kant or Bentham, "look for rules." Smith didn't like such rule books. Or you can stand with Sophocles, Thucydides, Adam Smith, and the sophists up to Jane Austen and Iris Murdoch, "look for exemplars," that is, human models of prudence or justice or love (Hariman 2003, p. 7) . Smith favored the humanistic teaching of ethics. For example, Plutarch (most of whose ample surviving work is ethical theorizing) was in his Lives steadily ethical, inspiring medieval saints" lives and modern mythologies of national heroes, William
Tell to the Blessed JFK. We are still writing the particular virtues, filming them, singing them, retelling the stories in the women's gossip or the men's instant replays. It is not merely the abstract, Aquinian analysis of, say, courage that forms an ethical tradition of resistance to fear. It is the stories of particular courages, in our particular faiths.
Or again you can compare the seven with virtues in other traditions, such as the Mencius is "what is appropriate," strikingly similar to the notion of neo-stoic and Ciceronian "propriety" elaborated in Smith (Van Norden 2004, p. 150) . Indeed "propriety" is often paired with "righteousness" in the translations from the Chinese.
And so forth. We are in a different ethical universe from a Kantian or utilitarian one, but not all that different from virtue ethics in the West.
Or yet again you can predict that if Aquinas's Seven are good places to start a philosophical psychology, then they should show up in the works of psychologists.
They do. A recent book published under the auspices of the American Psychological Association, edited by Christopher Peterson and Martin E. P. Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification (2004) , lends empirical support to the Seven, at any rate within the European tradition in which they were theorized. It seeks, as the philosopher Peter Danielson says in another connection, the "ethical genome." In 644 big-format text pages, using 2300 citations to the technical literature in clinical and social psychology and related fields, the 40 drafters of the chapters (which Peterson and Seligman then rewrote) present a "manual of the sanities," that is, the "positive psychology" of healthy people. These are not mere assertions but findings, summarizing a gigantic scientific literature, though a literature dealing chiefly with modern Europeans and Americans, not Chinese or Bantu.
What is most relevant here is that the 24 species of strengths they detect are clustered into the encompassing genuses of courage, humanity, justice, and so forththat is to say precisely the "virtues [,] . . . the core characteristics valued by [Western] philosophers and religious thinkers" (Peterson and Seligman 2004, p. 13) . The authors number them as six rather than seven, but this is mainly because they lump hope and faith together in one virtue named transcendence, that is, "strengths that forge connections to the larger universe and provide meaning" (p. 30). Five of their "High Six" virtues lay down with ease on the classical Seven-transcendence (that is, faith and hope), courage, humanity (that is, love, which appears in their classification as a "character strength" within what they view as the wider virtue), justice, and temperance. Smith it appears was on to something.
From the Seven Primary Virtues, I say, Adam Smith chose five to admire especially. He chose all four of the pagan and stoic virtues of courage, temperance, justice, and prudence. To these he added, as virtue number five, a part of the Christian virtue of love, the part which his tradition-such as that of his teacher at Edinburgh, Francis Hutcheson (1725, 1747)-called benevolence (though it must be admitted, as Gloria Vivenza points out to me, that Hutcheson's "lay benevolence" has transcendent features beyond eros and philia). In expositing Plato's system, for example, Smith enumerates the pagan four, "the essential virtue of prudence," the "noble" virtue of courage (TMS, p. 268), "a word [sōphrosynē] which we commonly translate temperance,"
and "justice, the last and greatest of the four cardinal virtues" (TMS, p. 269). In expositing stoicism he repeats the four, also with approval, speaking of virtue as "wise [that is, practically prudent: Greek phronesis], just, firm [that is, courageous], and temperate conduct" (p. 282). And then a triad of prudence, benevolence, justice:
"Concern for our own happiness recommends us to the virtue of prudence; concern for that of other people, the virtues of justice and beneficence," "the first . . . originally recommended by our selfish, the other two by our benevolent affections" (p. 262). An Impartial Spectator develops in the breast which "in the evening . . . often makes us blush inwardly both for our . . . inattention to our own happiness, and for our still greater indifference and inattention, perhaps, to that of other people" (p. 262).
Smith particularly admired what Hume had called the "artificial" virtues, the three on which any society must rest, namely, temperance, prudence, and justice. His admiration shows in his life plan to write a great, thick book about each: temperance is the master virtue of TMS, prudence of WN, and justice (though not only: TMS, p. 342) was to be that of a treatise on jurisprudence, never completed.
The other two virtues of the Smithian five were courage in, say, entrepreneurship and love in, say, family arrangements. These stood apart from Smith's central concerns And then Smith embarks on a concluding, climactic Section III, "Of SelfCommand," which has always been the master virtue in his book. "The man who acts according to the rules of perfect prudence, of strict justice, and of proper benevolence [love, that is] may be said to be perfectly virtuous" (p. 237). That accounts for three of the seven primary virtues-prudence, justice, and love. But suppose the man in question knows that he should act with prudence, justice, and love, but can't bring himself to do it? "The most perfect knowledge, if it is not supported by the most perfect self-command, will not always enable him to do his duty." "Extravagant fear and furious anger," to take one sort of passion, "[are] often difficult to restrain even for a single moment" (p. 238). The "command" of fear and anger was called by the ancients "fortitude, manhood, and strength of mind," which is to say the cardinal pagan virtue of courage. "The love of ease, of pleasure, of applause, and other selfish gratifications . . . often mislead us." The ancients called the command of these "temperance, decency, modesty, and moderation," that is to say, the cardinal virtue of temperance, so very much admired by the stoics (pp. 338-339; compare pp. 268f, 271) .
Smith then elaborates on the virtues of courage (pp. 238-240), temperance (pp. 240), a combined courage and temperance (self-command again, pp. 241-243), love briefly (p. 243), cowardice and courage again (pp. 243-246), and then discusses at length mere vanity as against proper self-esteem, figured repeatedly as temperance in judging oneself (pp. 246-262) . He asserts at the beginning of the section that "the principle of self-estimation may be too high, and it may likewise be too low" (p. 246) and ends the section by praising "the man who esteems himself as he ought, and no more than he ought" (p. 261).
Such an analysis of temperance is no great advance on Aristotle's golden mean.
But Smith did not seek striking originality in his ethical theory. He was building an ethic for a commercial society, but on the foundation of ethical thought in the West, not on some novelty c. 1710 or 1785 or 1789. Smith's main contribution to ethical theory in his own estimation was the notion of the Impartial Spectator -'reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct" (TMS, pp. 294, 137) . (Smith's use of dynamic theatrical metaphors such as the "Spectator," by the way, has been emphasized by David Marshall [1986] and especially by Charles Griswold [1999] ). The argument shows in the book's outline.
Smith begins with his own theory in Part I, "Of the Propriety of Action," to which merit "Those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain refinements of selflove think themselves at no loss to account" for sympathy. The supposed egoist rejoices in expressions of approval of his projects, and is downcast by expressions of disapproval, "but both the pleasure and the pain are always felt so instantaneously, and often upon such frivolous occasions [for example in a theatre for the characters portrayed, as he later notes; or in an account of some courageous act in ancient times], that it seems evident that neither of them can be derived from any such self-interested consideration" (TMS, . And so repeatedly throughout.
Smith is sometimes viewed as a stoic in the mold of Epictetus (FitzGibbons 1995; Raphael and Macfie 1976, p. 5-10) . But such a view, though importantly true in part, tends to specialize him down to temperance-only. As His admiring pages on stoicism are gathered in the 6 th edition into the chapter of section VII entitled "Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety," that is, those attending like his own system to a set of virtues instead of merely to one. And in the section VI added in 1790 he argues against the specialized excesses of stoic insensibility, or what we would now call Buddhist disengagement from the world. He recommends instead an active virtue, "that keen and earnest attention to the propriety of our own conduct, which constitutes the real essence of virtue" (p. 244).
A man following propriety shows in a temperate way all the primary virtues.
That is to say, he shows a balance of all them, or selects the sub-set appropriate to the Philosophical Subjects, p. 262). This is stoicism, perhaps, but in a distinctly virtue-ethical key, admiring frugality, probity, plainness of manners, love of learning, generosity of heart, great-heartedness, enduring courage, cheerfulness, candor, penetration, circumspection, and sincerity. It admires in short the bourgeois virtues, all of them, together in a system, just as virtue ethicists recommend.
Vivienne Brown, who supports the notion that Smith thinks as I say in terms of the virtues in TMS, argues that in WN by contrast he cannot be seen as ethical at all. She declares especially that the book "cannot be read as an endorsement of "liberal capitalism' '(1994, p. 53) . She argues that the highly "dialogic" character of TMS makes it an ethical work (pp. 188 (195) . The two texts are seen as emphasizing two different sets of so-called virtues, in a hierarchy denying in fact the lower set ethical any true ethical standing. "The truly moral virtues of beneficence and self-command in TMS," she writes, "are those that define the moral agent as engaged in a dialogic encounter with the self, a moral process of internal debate that is represented by the metaphor of the impartial spectator." In her reading "the other virtues of justice and prudence'-the main subjects of WN as against TMS-'are therefore denominated as second-order, . . .
[eliciting] a certain esteem, . . . [but not] truly moral virtues" (p. 208).
It is Brown, not Smith, I would reply, who thus "denominates" prudence and justice as second-order, in aid of downplaying Smith's evident approval of the economic parts of "the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice" (WN, p. 664). Brown's ingenious application of Bakhtin's notion of dialogic as against monologic discourse certainly does illuminate the rhetoric of the two books. But speaking of rhetoric, WN was written to influence policy under the control of men who fancied themselves as prudent above all. To be effective rhetorically the book had to follow Smith's own 19 19 advice about anger and indignation in TMS-"before resentment . . . can become graceful and agreeable it must be. . . brought down below that pitch to which it would naturally rise than almost every other passion" (TMS, p. 34). A book on "police" would do so.
Nonetheless, Smith's indignation regularly broke out in WN, as Brown admits (Brown 1994, p. 190) . WN, as and Fleischacker (throughout) argue, is an ethical book. One can agree with Brown that ethics depends on "a moral process of internal debate." But justice and prudence in Smith are not in fact treated non-dialogically, as Brown to the contrary asserts. In both books Smith gives hundreds of instances of the Impartial Spectator staging an internal debate about even these "second-order" virtues.
I noted the revival of virtue ethics after Elizabeth Anscombe's essay in 1958, "Modern Moral Philosophy." (The revival, by the way, has been led notably by women; ethics is the only part of academic philosophy with a substantially feminine voice, a voice heard with growing volume since the 1950s.) The revival directed attention to the desirability of talking about a set of virtues directly, rather than talking in Enlightenment style only of one allegedly Universal Principle. "It would be a great improvement," wrote Anscombe, "if, instead of 'morally wrong,' one always named a genus such as 'untruthful,' 'unchaste,' 'unjust'" (Anscombe [1958 (Anscombe [ ] 1997 .
But where does one stop in listing the virtues of, say, truthfulness, chastity, justice, and the like? A list of 170 virtues would be so broad as to be useless. The point is worth stressing here because Smith's definite five virtues, and his emphasis on the joint cultivation of the five by the Impartial Spectator, puts him solidly in the older 
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Love was one of the Smithian virtues, but balanced with pluralism. In TMS the "amiable" Christianity of Hutcheson came in for criticism chiefly because it tended to suppose that "the mixture of any selfish motive, like that of a baser alloy, . . . took away altogether the merit that would otherwise have belonged to any action" (TMS, p. 302).
According to the system of love-only "self-love was a principle which could never be virtuous in any degree or in any direction" (TMS, p. 303). Such a specialized version of Smith's confining of attention to five virtues, then, avoided the dual errors of quantity in modern ethical thinking-too many virtues or too few. The other two errors are of quality and of object. Smith's obsolete virtue-ethical system avoided them as well.
The most prevalent error is that of quality, the reduction of ethics to taste, or rather to "mere" taste, viewed as analogous to a taste for chocolate ice cream. Though ancient, found for example in some Platonic characters, it has in recent times been argument; he couldn't know, he refused to know everything; so that his judgments, nominally based on that partial information, were really inspired by passionate prejudice and were always unfair and sometimes mad. He would say, for instance, that 28 28 the bishops supported the war because they had money invested in munitions works" (Santayana 1943-53, p. 441) .
We can't have reasonable ethical lives, the virtue ethicists like Smith claim, if we depend only on a narrow definition of reason. "But though reason is undoubtedly the source of the general rules of morality," Smith noted, without much optimism that "general rules" were themselves worth having, "it is altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from reason" (TMS, p. 320). Such taste, however, is not "mere" in Smith, to be determined without education or reflection. It is rather the providing of good reasons, yielding "reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct" (TMS, p. 137).
The other characteristically modern error in thinking about ethics is an error of object. The error is more technical than the chocolate ice cream theory just described, and is committed especially by analytic philosophers venturing into ethics. It reduces ethics to matters of how you treat other people. That might seem to be no error. Surely ethics is about altruism? No, it is not, not only. Look back at the diagram, and note the ethical objects of self, of others, and of the transcendent. The good life will involve all three. A triple perfection, one might say.
For example, the philosopher Susan Wolf in a well-known essay, "Moral Saints," adopts an exclusively public, social, altruistic definition of "virtue" (1982 [1997] , p. 80, line 7, "improving the welfare of others or of society as a whole," among many other places--four times on p. 80, for example; on p. 81; p. 85, middle; taken back on p. 93, top, but then, "This approach seems unlikely to succeed'). In the style of many Anglophone 29 29 philosophers she leaves out privately self-interested prudence as a virtue, and so lets her moral saints behave badly towards themselves. Showing its badness is Wolf's point, by a reduction to absurdity: moral saints are objectionable precisely because they care nothing for themselves. "If the moral saint is devoting all his time to feeding the hungry," Wolf observes, "then necessarily he is not reading Victorian novels, playing the oboe, or improving his backhand. . . . A life in which none of these possible aspects of character is developed may seem a life strangely barren" (Wolf [1982 (Wolf [ ] (1997 ).
It's the Jewish-mother version of goodness: "Oh, don't bother to replace the bulb.
I'll just sit here in the dark." But the mother, after all, is God's creature, too, and her benevolence therefore should include a just benevolence towards herself. Being wholly altruistic, and disregarding the claims of that person also in the room called Self, about whose needs the very Self is ordinarily best informed, is making the same mistake as being wholly selfish, disregarding the claims of that person called Other. Smith of course agreed. It is the characteristically anti-paternalistic feature of his thought to assert that Self is best informed about Self's needs. Prudence within a set of cultivated virtues is not self-centeredness.
Even very sensible philosophers want nowadays to deny such an obvious truth by reducing every virtue to improving the welfare of others or of society as a whole. In his last book Robert Nozick, who was most famous for his attempt to bring libertarian ideas traceable in part to Smith into political philosophy, tried to argue that "ethics exists because at least sometimes it is possible to coordinate actions to mutual benefit" (2001, p. 244 ; the next two quotations are from pp. 246 and 256). This is the economist's all-ye-need-to-know, the new welfare economics of the 1930s. Or: "Ethics arises when frequently or importantly there are situations offering opportunities for mutual benefit from coordinated activity." And a utilitarian, which Nozick tried not to be, would say that "since cooperation to mutual benefit is the function of ethics, the only thing that matters is . . . the size of the social pie."
But after 64 closely reasoned pages Nozick is left worrying that ethics must have something more. The reason he gets into trouble is that he makes that characteristically modern philosophical error of simply defining ethics as "concerning interpersonal relations" (2001, p. 248) . In other words, his main argument has no place for the virtues of self-improvement or of devotion to a transcendent. It is a middle-level ethics, neither at the hope-faith-transcendent-love top or the temperance-self-interested-courage bottom, but aimed at a shallow conception of justice-only implemented with prudence.
It is entirely about economics; that is to say, about "Pareto optimality," about mutually beneficial deals in the middle range. The ethical objects are the other people in the deal, not ever oneself or God.
But I said Nozick was sensible. And it is hard to imagine a more intellectually honest person. So occasionally he breaks into praise for the alternative ethical objects, as though realizing uneasily that his reduction to prudent-but-procedurally-just deals has not sufficed. He distinguishes four "levels or layers of ethics," referring to a treatment in his semi-popular book of 1989, The Examined Life (2001, p. 280; 1989, pp. 212-215) James Otteson has tried to place Smith in an evolutionary frame, a version of prudence-only along Nozickian lines, in which "over time, people find that they can better satisfy their interests if they cooperate in certain ways" (2002, p. 295) . "Rules about propriety and contracts are those that have proved to satisfy human interests most efficiently" (p. 296). "The goal whose attainment these exercises make more likely is 33 33 mutual sympathy of sentiments" (p. 294). This seems to come at it the wrong way.
Moral sympathy in Smith is the input, not the output, as can be judged from the organization of TMS: it starts with sympathy, sharply distinguishing it from selfishness.
The output is the ethical person, for her own sweet sake, not for the sake of "better satisfying [her] interests." Interests are good, says Smith, since poverty is bad, and it was surely part of Smith's project to "detoxify the pursuit of wealth," as Griswold puts it (1999, p. 265) . But in both TMS and (even) WN Smith roundly attacks better-satisfyinginterests as a final end of living.
Smith is also very fierce against rules and maxims, even "rules about propriety and contracts," unless the strict rules of procedural justice, as though he did know about Professor Kant's theorizing in far Köningsberg, and had a low opinion of it. I have noted his attacks on casuistry, which he understood as the giving of rules (Toulmin and Jonsen 1987 give it a more sympathetic reading). He says elsewhere that "the general rules of almost all the virtues . . . are in many respects loose and inaccurate. . . and require so many modifications that it is scarcely possible to regulate our conduct entirely by regard to them" (TMS, p. 174).
One is reminded (and so is Otteson: p. 268n20) of the most extreme of the evolutionary psychologists nowadays, such as Steven Pinker. Listen to Pinker in 1997 on the rationality of friendship: "now that you value the person, they should value you even more . . . because of your stake in rescuing him or her from hard times . . . This runaway process is what we call friendship" (Pinker (1997 , quoted in Fodor (1998 .
No, Steven, it is what we call self-absorption. The cognitive philosopher Jerry Fodor remarks of Pinker's one-factor theory:
A concern to propagate one's genes would rationalize one's acting to promote one's children's welfare; but so too would an interest in one's children's welfare. Not all of one's motives could be instrumental, after all; there must be some things that one cares for just for their own sakes. Why, indeed, mightn't there be quite a few such things? Why shouldn't one's children be among them? But where are the other two, sacred hope and sacred faith, and the transcendent part of love? Hursthouse ends her book with an appeal to "Keep hope alive." Her only other mention of hope and faith is a page attacking the so-called virtue of piety, which combines them, as irrational, not characteristically human, "based on a complete illusion" from an atheist's point of view (Hursthouse 1999, p. 232f; compare 218 : "But what could this fifth end be?'). One wonders, though: is the physicist's pious but entirely atheistic faith in the orderliness of nature, which Smith and Hume and Kant buried in their magic adjective "natural," and which Hursthouse elsewhere notes is essential for a scientific world view, therefore also "irrational'? Is science, then, as religious faith is in her account, "based on a complete illusion'? Hursthouse's own project-based on the pious hope that the virtues can be justified piecemeal from within a cultural set of them-is likewise undercut.
We humans cannot get along without transcendence, which is faith in a past, hope for a future, love for an ideal, justified by Larger Considerations. If we don't have faith, hope, and love for God, we'll substitute Art or Science or National Learning. If we don't have Art or Science or National Learning or Anglicanism we'll substitute '( 1984, p. 21) . Evidently the answer is no. There are consequences and there will be more. That is not a reason to return to the older sureties, although I do warmly recommend progressive Episcopalianism. But it is a reason to take seriously the transcendent in our imagined lives. Adam Smith's error was the error, and the glory, of the Enlightenment, trying to liberate us from transcendence. And how was this faithful and loving hope, this aspiration to full humanity, to be achieved? Through cultivating the seven virtues-or Smith's five, with hope and faith and transcendent love knocking softly at the back door.
